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NOTE 
SECURITIES FRAUD, OFFICER AND DIRECTOR 
BARS, AND THE “UNFITNESS” INQUIRY  
AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 
 
Jon Carlson∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 1988, Ratilal Patel and Dilip Shah were executives of two 
successful and related pharmaceutical companies.1  Patel was a founder, 
director, and officer of Par Pharmaceuticals; Shah was the president of 
Par’s subsidiary Quad Pharmaceuticals.2  Par and Quad were rising stars 
in the generic drug industry, and long-term investors in Par were un-
doubtedly delighted by the steady gains in the company’s stock price.3  
In the summer of 2008, however, the good times came to an abrupt end 
when federal prosecutors indicted Patel and Shah for their roles in 
bribing and defrauding the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), acts 
that had resulted in the distribution of untested and unapproved versions 
of the companies’ drugs to consumers.4  The market for Par stock 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham Unviersity School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Professor Caroline Gentile for her guidance and encouragement during the Note-writing 
process. 
 1. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 1995); SEC v. Patel, No. 93 Civ. 4603, 
1994 WL 364089, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1994); SEC v. Shah, No. 92 Civ. 1952, 1993 
WL 288285, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993). 
 2. Patel, 61 F.3d at 138; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *1. 
 3. See Yahoo! Finance, Historical Prices, Par Pharm. Cos., Inc. (PRX), http://fin 
ance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=PRX&a=11&b=30&c=1987&d=00&e=2&f=2009&g=d&z=66
&y=5214(last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (listing historical daily closing price of Par stock 
from Dec. 1987 – Mar. 1988). 
 4. Patel, 61 F.3d at 138; Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *1; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, 
at *2.  Though Shah and Patel were only charged with bribing a public official, their 
scheme also may have violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  The ship-
ping of adulterated or mislabeled food or drugs is a serious offense, and managers of 
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reacted swiftly:  the price dropped from $17.37 to $10.12 in the course 
of three months.5 
The scandal went far beyond what prosecutors initially thought had 
occurred.  Not only had Shah and Patel sabotaged the mechanisms that 
were designed to ensure the safety of their drugs, they had also begun 
selling their Par stock prior to the public announcement of their mis-
conduct with the FDA.6  Consequently, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) sued, alleging fraud, and sought to have both men 
permanently barred from serving as managers of any publicly traded 
company.7  In both cases, however, the courts ultimately held that the 
managers’ misconduct did not justify such a remedy.8 
At this moment, Shah and Patel may be in a boardroom, managing 
a company owned by widely dispersed members of the public.  Why 
would any rational person invest in a company run by someone like 
Shah or Patel?  In some cases, public investors have no meaningful 
choice in the matter because they do not know of the current manage-
ment’s prior wrongdoing.9  In other cases, shareholders are the direct 
beneficiaries of corporate misconduct and thus have no incentive to oust 
misbehaving management.10  Why would the government allow such a 
person to continue serving in a position of public trust?  Simply put, it 
does not allow it.11 
For many years, the SEC has sought to bar corporate managers and 
others whose illegal misconduct shows contempt or disregard for the na-
tion’s scheme of securities regulation.12  Federal securities regulation is 
corporations charged with such a violation can be held strictly liable.  See United States 
v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (discussing the case law’s position that managers 
must be held accountable and holding CEO strictly liable for the company’s violation of 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
 5. On July 13, 1988, the stock closed at $17.375.  Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *2.  
By October 24, 1988, the price had fallen to $10.12, with sharp declines occurring as 
more negative press was released.  Id.  The price fell to $7.125 by July 25, 1989.  Patel, 
61 F.3d at 139. 
 6. Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *1; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *1. 
 7. Patel, 1994 WL 364089, at *1-2; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *3. 
 8. Patel, 61 F.3d at 142; Shah, 1993 WL 288285, at *7. 
 9. Dispersed shareholders may also lack the control necessary to oust a violating 
manager once they have learned of the violation.  S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 18 (1990). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2008); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C § 78(u)(d)(2) (2008). 
 12. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-616, at 31-32 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
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designed to promote free and efficient capital markets by ensuring that 
up-to-date information flows freely from corporate issuers to the 
public.13  By introducing untrue or misleading information into the mar-
ket, fraud undermines this freedom and efficiency.14  Securities fraud is 
a serious violation and violators are subject to a variety of securities law 
sanctions, including monetary penalties, disgorgement, occupational 
bars, and imprisonment.15  The SEC has used the officer and director bar 
particularly to prevent perpetrators of fraud from serving as fiduciaries 
to the public.16 
This Note examines the federal courts’ inconsistent and problematic 
interpretations of the officer and director bar statutes and proposes a 
solution that satisfies Congress’s intent and that is fair both to the SEC 
and to the defendants in enforcement proceedings.  Part I reviews the 
history of the officer and director bar as a remedy for securities fraud 
violations.  It concludes by explaining how Congress responded to cases 
like Shah and Patel in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-
Oxley”).  Part II categorizes and discusses the various approaches that 
federal courts have taken in interpreting and applying the officer and di-
rector bar after Congress amended the bar statutes in Sarbanes-Oxley.  
So far, few courts have demonstrated a clear understanding of the 
amended statutes.  Part III draws from the history of the officer and di-
rector bar, including the events leading up to the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley, to propose a solution that is consistent with the legislative pur-
pose of the amended statutes and the past seventy years of securities en-
forcement. 
I. 
The officer and director bar has had a tortuous history in both fed-
eral legislation and the courts.  Knowledge of this history is essential to 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1394-95. 
 13. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 36-38 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining how the “disclosure philosophy” of 
securities regulation came to be the scheme embodied in the federal securities laws). 
 14. See, e.g., Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
119, 147 (2002). 
 15. See generally Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) [hereinafter Remedies Act] 
(providing examples of stated remedies for instances of fraud). 
 16. H.R. REP. NO.101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1380. 
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understanding the meaning of the most recent amendment to the officer 
and director bar statutes.17 
A.  Injunction 
The director and officer bar originated as a form of injunctive relief 
for violations of the securities laws.  Prior to 1984, the only remedy ex-
pressly provided for such violations was an injunction against future vio-
lations.18  The first courts to issue officer and director bars did so by 
fashioning injunctions that specifically prohibited defendants from fur-
ther service as corporate executives.19  The significance of the bar’s ori-
gin is more than historical: the legal standards for and limitations on im-
posing injunctive relief continue to be influential in defining the reach of 
the modern officer and director bar. 
Generally speaking, an SEC injunction is a broad obey-the-law 
order prohibiting the defendant from future violations of securities 
laws.20  Critics argue that such an injunction serves only as a slap on the 
wrist because it does little to deter first-time violations, does not provide 
restitution for the victims of violations, and imposes few, if any, costs on 
securities violators who may have profited enormously from their mis-
conduct.21  An injunction is, in the words of the Supreme Court, a “mild 
prophylactic.”22 
The power of an injunction is its effect on the defendant’s future 
conduct.  Those who continue their misconduct despite an injunction 
face substantial penalties, including civil or criminal contempt.23  Those 
who obey the injunction may face other costs, including reputational 
 
 17. The most recent amendment is in section 305 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (2006). 
 18. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 was the first piece of legislation to 
grant the SEC the authority to seek relief other than an injunction.  See S. REP. NO. 101-
337, at 6 (1990). 
 19. See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 
1972); SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966). 
 20. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2008); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2008). 
 21. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 6. 
 22. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963). 
 23. See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (ordering defendant to turn himself over for incarceration for failing to comply 
with equitable remedy of disgorgement). 
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damage or stigma.24  Therefore, while an injunction may be sufficient to 
correct the behavior of a past violator, it does not have a significant pre-
ventive effect against first time violations. 
Perhaps in recognition of the need for more effective remedies, 
courts began to develop separate “ancillary” remedies to supplement the 
general injunction.25  An injunction was traditionally a remedy of courts 
of equity, and courts of equity have long fashioned other rules and 
remedies to suit the particular facts of a case.26  Federal courts undertook 
to create such forms of “ancillary relief” in securities enforcement ac-
tions by reasoning that the SEC injunction actions provided them with 
equity jurisdiction over the case.27  Courts willingly adapted these new 
remedies when it was “necessary and proper” to do so.28  Among the 
forms of ancillary relief created by the courts were disgorgement of ill-
gotten profits, as well as the officer and director bar.29  Early cases bar-
ring defendants from serving as officers and directors specially empha-
sized the importance of such action when it was necessary to protect 
public investors, as this is the general purpose of the securities laws.30 
Once the SEC has sufficiently established that a defendant has vio-
lated a provision of the securities laws, a court may grant an injunction 
or ancillary relief if the defendant’s past conduct indicates that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of future violations.31  The underlying violation, 
without more, is insufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of recurrence.32  
In assessing the likelihood of future violations, courts most commonly 
consider the following factors: (1) the defendant’s history of past 
violations, (2) the degree of scienter involved in violations, (3) whether 
the violations are isolated or recurring and continuous, (4) the defend-
ant’s acceptance of responsibility and assurances against future miscon-
 24. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (1980). 
 25. See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 26. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 27. SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 28 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1394. 
 29. Id. at 1398. 
 30. See Advance Growth Capital, 470 F.2d at 53-54. 
 31. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 32. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978); see SEC v. Jones, 476 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying the SEC’s request for an injunction where 
the SEC demonstrated only past misconduct). 
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duct, and (5) whether the defendant’s occupation puts him or her in a 
position to commit further violations.33 
The likelihood of recurrence standard for obtaining an injunction 
and its five-factor test continue to be important in officer and director 
bar cases in two ways.  First, courts still enjoin persons from acting as 
officers or directors as a form of ancillary relief under their general equi-
table power to impose an injunction.34  In those cases, proof of a vio-
lation and a showing that the defendant is likely to engage in future mis-
conduct are the only requirements.35  Second, under more recent cases 
involving the express officer and director bar statutes, courts have re-
turned to the likelihood of recurrence standard when determining the 
propriety of permanently barring a corporate executive.36 
B.  The Remedies Act 
In 1990, Congress passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act (“Remedies Act”) in response to the “wide 
range of securities law violations in the large and increasingly complex 
securities markets.”37  The Remedies Act amended the existing 
securities laws by granting the SEC the express authority to seek several 
new remedies, including officer and director bars.38 
 
Congress’s stated purpose in passing the Remedies Act was to grant 
the SEC the authority and flexibility to “maximize the remedial effects 
of its enforcement actions” and to “achieve the appropriate level of de-
 33. SEC v. Cavanaugh, 155 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1477-78 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 
F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 34. See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 35. See generally id. at 521-22 (“The court found that they had committed securi-
ties law violations . . . and that their past securities law violations and lack of assurances 
against future violations demonstrated that such violations were likely to continue.”); 
SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“The 
propriety of injunctive relief turns on whether ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
wrong will be repeated.’”). 
 36. See infra Part I.D. 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 14 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1381. 
 38. Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 101, 201, 104 Stat. 931, 932, 935 
(1990). 
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terrence in each case.”39  Implicit in this purpose was the view that the 
securities market was expanding beyond the SEC’s enforcement capaci-
ty and that injunctions, the SEC’s sole remedy up to that point, were in-
adequate to deter misconduct and too cumbersome to adapt to a specific 
defendant’s violation.40 Congress designed the Remedies Act to do more 
than expressly provide for remedies that were already implied. Rather, 
the Remedies Act was designed to strengthen the SEC’s enforcement 
program and to deter violations.41 
In terms of general deterrence, the officer and director bar is one of 
the most effective enforcement mechanisms at the SEC’s disposal.  To a 
corporate executive, a bar order may be more devastating than a mone-
tary fine or even imprisonment.42  Indeed, it is intended to be:  the direc-
tor and officer bar serves as a pecuniary sanction for wealthy fiduciaries 
who are likely to view a fine as an inconsequential cost of doing busi-
ness.43  Nevertheless, the officer and director bar is not a one-size-fits-all 
remedy.  It is a severe sanction that may force a corporate executive to 
abandon her career and possibly her lifestyle.44  In contrast, to a lower-
ranking violator who has never served as a corporate manager and is 
unlikely to do so in the future, the officer and director bar may be an 
ineffective deterrent and would be less painful than a civil monetary 
penalty.45  The legislative history makes clear, however, that Congress’s 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1380. 
 40. See id at 1381.  The legislative history provides statistics showing the rapid 
growth of the securities markets in the decade leading up to the Remedies Act.  The 
market boom and the concern that the SEC may not be able to police misconduct serve 
as premises for the conclusion that expresses remedies (and therefore more deterrence) 
is necessary.  The report does not state that the SEC’s sole remedy of injunction is 
insufficient to enforce and deter, but this is obviously an assumption. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive “Substantially Unfit to 
Serve”?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1522 (1992) [hereinafter Barnard, Substantially Unfit to 
Serve?] (arguing that an officer and director bar is harsher than imprisonment because it 
deprives corporate executives of the potential ever to find a high-paying job). 
 43. Id. at 1495. 
 44. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 12.  Note, however, 
that not all barred executives are in danger of losing everything.  See, e.g., SEC v. 
Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 596, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (barring 
defendants who were wealthy controlling shareholders of numerous corporations from 
exercising control or voting rights over the corporations). 
 45. SEC v. Drucker, 528 F. Supp. 2d 450, 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (barring 
defendant who committed insider trading as in-house counsel, but not barring tippee of 
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intent with the officer and director bar was to deter corporate miscon-
duct and to send a signal to public investors that the markets were safe 
from the actions of proven violators.46 
In an effort to limit the potentially devastating effects of the officer 
and director bar, Congress sought to apply it only to the most serious 
securities laws violators.  Under the Remedies Act, a court was author-
ized to bar “any person who violated [either of the ‘hard core’ fraud 
provisions47] from acting as an officer or director of any [public 
company] if the person’s conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to 
serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.”48 
Separated into its key components, the bar statute applied (1) to any 
person; (2) who was found by a court to have engaged in securities 
fraud; and (3) who was found to be substantially unfit to serve as an 
officer or director of a public company.49  Thus, to obtain a bar, the SEC 
had a two-part burden: it was required to show fraud plus substantial 
unfitness by a preponderance of the evidence.50 
Once a court has imposed an officer and director bar, it only 
prohibits the defendant from acting as an officer or director of a public 
company.51  The term “public company” refers to a company that has 
over $1,000,000 in assets and more than 500 shareholders.52  Simply 
put, a public company is a corporation whose stock is held by a large 
number of widely dispersed shareholders.  The securities laws protect 
the shareholders of such widely held corporations because they are less 
likely to have the knowledge, sophistication, or control sufficient to hire 
and fire management.53  Nothing, however, prohibits a barred officer or 
inside information who was a retired police officer and was never likely to serve as a 
corporate manager). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1394. 
 47. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 1510. 
 48. Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 101, 201,104 Stat. 931, 932, 935 
(1990). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding 
preponderance of the evidence is the proper burden of proof in all SEC enforcement 
actions including debarment cases). 
 51. See Remedies Act, §§ 101, 201. 
 52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78l (2000). 
 53. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (defining the 
public as those people for whom the securities laws were designed to protect); S. REP. 
NO. 101-337, at 21 (1990) (explaining the need for the officer and director bar because 
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its reach only to 
public companies. 
C.  Defining Substantial Unfitness and the Six-Factor Test
director from serving as a manager of a non-public company, usually 
called a closely held company.  Closely held companies are subject to 
minimal SEC regulation54 and have become increasingly popular with 
the modern rise of “cash out” mergers55 and other efforts to “go 
private”.56  Thus, the officer and director bar is a potentially severe 
sanction for corporate executives, but Congress has limited its 
application only to the most egregious violators and 
 
e law and academic literature dealing with the 
offic
 
By the time Congress passed the Remedies Act, the elements of 
securities fraud had been fairly well established.   The other require-
ment for obtaining an officer and director bar, “substantial unfitness,” 
was a new term of art left undefined by the Remedies Act and the legis-
lative history.   The definition of “substantial unfitness” thus became 
the central issue in the cas
57
58
er and director bar.59 
The definition of “substantial unfitness” was not completely ambig-
uous, however.  Sensible construction suggested that the test for “sub-
stantial unfitness” lay between two distinct boundaries.  At one end, the 
defendant’s act of fraud alone, without aggravating factors, could not be 
sufficient to justify a bar.  After all, the required showing was fraud plus 
dispersed shareholders rarely have the collective power to oust violators from manage-
ment). 
 54. Sections 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not require 
closely held companies to register their securities or make periodic reports.  See 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78(l), 78(m) (2008).  Nevertheless, closely held companies and their prince-
pals are still subject to the anti-fraud provisions, which apply to any person.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78j (2008); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (2000). 
 55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2007) (defining “short form” or “cash out” 
merger). 
 56. David A. Stockton et al., Going Private: The Best Option?, NAT’L L. J., June 
23, 2003, at 19 (citing a study by FactSet Mergerstat indicating that completed going-
private deals, as a percentage of mergers and acquisition transactions, increased by ap-
proximately 23.7% from 2000 to 2002). 
 57. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 914-18 (outlining the elements of 
securities fraud and citing the court opinions that established those elements). 
 58. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff: 
Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute (Feb. 15, 
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch538.htm. 
 59. Id. 
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the “substantial unfitness” issue was left to judicial inter-
preta
s added it into 
the a
ceedings.66  In the seminal case Steadman v. SEC, the Fifth Circuit held 
“substantial unfitness,” and the legislative history indicates that 
Congress favored limiting the application of the bar only to the most 
serious violators.60  At the other end, the test for “substantial unfitness” 
needed to be more flexible than the test required for the SEC to obtain 
an injunction.  If the SEC could easily establish that a defendant was 
likely to commit future violations as a corporate manager, then it could 
obtain a bar under its authority to seek an injunction.61  In that case, the 
officer and director bar statutes would be rendered superfluous.  There-
fore, “substantial unfitness” could not logically be equated with the de-
fendant’s likelihood of recurrence plus other factors.  This view was 
supported by the fact that the Remedies Act was designed to enhance the 
SEC enforcement program, not to hinder it.62  With these two guidelines 
in place, 
tion. 
Courts quickly adopted a “substantial unfitness” test, initially sug-
gested in a 1992 law review article by Professor Jayne Barnard.63  
Professor Barnard suggested that to determine whether a defendant is 
substantially unfit, courts should consider:  (1) the egregiousness of the 
underlying violation, (2) the defendant’s repeat offender status, (3) the 
role of the defendant in the scheme to defraud, (4) the defendant’s de-
gree of scienter, (5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation, (6) 
the likelihood that misconduct will recur, and (7) the defendant’s appre-
ciation of a corporate manager’s fiduciary obligations.64  Courts that 
adopted this test abondoned the last factor and sometime
nalysis of the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence.65 
The six factors in Professor Barnard’s modified test are nearly 
identical to the six factors that courts have long applied in reviewing the 
propriety of sanctions imposed by the SEC in administrative pro-
 
 60. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 20 (1990) (stating that a permanent bar may be 
especially appropriate where the defendant’s conduct was egregious or the defendant 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 14 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
510-21. 
was a recidivist). 
 61. See supra Part I.A. 
 62. 
1381. 
 63. Cutler, supra note 58. 
 64. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1
 65. See, e.g., SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 66. See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979).  There are a few 
differences in Professor Barnard’s factors and the factors utilized by the court in 
Steadman:  Barnard’s factors consider the defendant’s economic stake in the violation 
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that when the SEC seeks to impose an occupational bar, it must clearly 
articulate its reasons for believing that such a severe sanction is more 
appropriate than a less severe alternative.67  To that end, Steadman held 
that the SEC may consider and discuss:  (1) the egregiousness of the de-
fendant’s actions, (2) the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, 
(3) the degree of scienter involved, (4) the sincerity of the defendant’s 
assurances against future violations, (5) the defendant’s recognition of 
the wrongful nature of his conduct, and (6) the likelihood that the de-
fendant’s occupation will present opportunities for future violations.68 
Steadman suggested that some factors – such as the egregiousness 
of the defendant’s violation, the defendant’s level of scienter and the 
likelihood of recurrence – may carry more weight than others.69  
Furthermore, Steadman held that the six factors were a list of possible 
considerations, and not a conjunctive test.70  Thus, the SEC was not 
required to demonstrate facts to satisfy all six factors in order to justify 
its decision to impose 
Professor Barnard intended the six factor test to limit the applica-
tion of the officer and director bar as a remedy for fraud.71  She was con-
cerned that the bar was too strict a punishment that, if applied unwisely, 
could detrimentally affect shareholder agency and the lives of talented, 
though tarnished, managers.72 
and the Steadman factors do not; the court in Steadman considered whether the 
defendant had recognized the wrongful nature of his conduct, while Professor Barnard 
asks whether the defendant understands his role as a corporate fiduciary.  All other 
differences are minor changes in verbiage. 
 67. Id. at 1139-40. 
 68. Id. at 1140.  The Steadman factors remain the test by which federal courts 
review the SEC’s imposition of any sanction in an administrative court proceeding.  
See, e.g., In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 2001 
SEC LEXIS 98, at *98 (Jan. 19, 2001) (requiring a review of the Steadman factors 
before the SEC can impose sanctions in an SEC administrative proceeding); In re Maria 
T. Giesge, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-12747, Initial Decision Rel. No. 359, at 31-32 (Oct. 
7, 2008). 
 69. Steadman, 603 F.2d at 1140. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1510 (urging 
courts to exercise caution as the bar “inherently invites overuse”). 
 72. Id. at 1522. 
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D.  Patel and the Application of the Six Factor Test in Court. 
In 1993, the Southern District of New York became the first court 
to apply Professor Barnard’s six-factor test in SEC v. Shah.73  The SEC 
sued Dilip Shah, alleging fraud in connection with Shah’s scheme to de-
fraud the FDA and his sale of company stock before the public learned 
of the government’s investigation and the subsequent indictment.74  At 
trial, Shah conceded that his trading constituted securities fraud.75  The 
SEC sought an officer and director bar and the only unresolved issue 
was whether Shah was substantially unfit.  The court, noting the need for 
a workable definition of “substantial unfitness,” applied Professor 
Barnard’s six-factor test.76  The court’s analysis led it to conclude that 
Shah was not substantially unfit, despite the fact that over a period of 
several years he had endangered the public health, defrauded the federal 
government and engaged in insider trading.77  The court’s six-factor 
analysis is summarized below: 
 
(1) Egregiousness of the Underlying Violation:  The violation 
was not egregious because defendant avoided only a small 
loss by selling ahead of the public announcement of the 
indictment. 
(2) Defendant’s Repeat Offender Status:  There were no past 
violations of law. 
(3) Defendant’s Role in the Fraud:  Shah was an officer of the 
corporation and an active participant in the conspiracy to 
defraud the FDA. 
(4) Defendant’s Degree of Scienter:  The degree of scienter 
was low because there was no evidence of clandestine 
trading or tipping. 
(5) Defendant’s Economic Stake in the Violation:  The defend-
ant received all of the loss that he avoided. 
 
 73. SEC v. Shah, No. 92 Civ. 1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 
1993).  The basic facts of Shah are set out supra in the Introduction. 
 74. Id. at *3. 
 75. Id. at *7. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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(6) Likelihood that Misconduct Will Recur:  The defendant is 
unlikely to commit future violations given his past record, 
the harshness of his criminal penalties, and the SEC’s 
monetary damages.78 
 
In sum, Shah was the president of a public company who coordi-
nated a scheme spanning several years to defraud the FDA and endanger 
the public welfare while trading in the company’s stock.  Although the 
court did not find him substantially unfit, other courts have subsequently 
treated similar conduct as especially relevant in terms of showing egre-
giousness,79 scienter,80 and the likelihood of recurrence.81 
Two years after Shah, the Second Circuit applied its own twist to 
the six-factor test in Patel and significantly raised the SEC’s burden for 
obtaining a bar in most cases.82  The defendant in Patel was a co-
conspirator in Shah’s scheme to defraud the FDA.  Both Patel and Shah 
sold their shares of the company stock before the public learned of their 
illegal acts.83  In contrast to Shah, the Southern District of New York did 
permanently bar Patel from acting as an officer or director of any public 
company on essentially the same set of facts as Shah.84  On appeal, Patel 
argued that the six-factor test is “in essence a test of a defendant’s pro-
pensity for recidivism” and that the bar order issued against him should 
be reversed because the district court erroneously concluded that Patel 
was likely to commit future misconduct.85  The Second Circuit agreed.86  
Elevating the sixth factor – the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence – 
above all other factors, the Second Circuit held that before issuing an 
officer and director bar, a district court must clearly state facts showing 
a defendant’s likelihood of recurrence, especially if the defendant has no 
 78. Id. 
 79. See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant’s 
scheme to defraud the FDA, in addition to his acts of securities fraud, was egregious). 
 80. SEC v. Global Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 2d 94, 121-22 (D.Conn. 
2004). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141-43. 
 83. Id. at 138-39. 
 84. SEC v. Patel, No. 93 CIV. 4603, 1994 WL 364089, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 
1994). 
 85. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Ratilal Patel at 16, SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 
No. 94-6218 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 1994). 
 86. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141-42. 
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past violations.87  Patel also held that courts should always consider 
whether a temporary or conditional bar is a more appropriate remedy, 
especially where the defendant has no prior history of violations.88 
Patel sought to limit the harsh effects of the officer and director bar 
as a remedy against corporate executives,89 but it created more problems 
than it resolved.  First, the officer and director bar was intended to be 
harsh.  Its purpose was to serve as a conspicuous deterrent and a power-
ful means of penalizing the most egregious corporate violators of the 
public trust.90  Second, the Remedies Act made the officer and director 
bar an express remedy as a part of its initiative in making the SEC’s en-
forcement program more effective and efficient.91  By equating “sub-
stantial unfitness” with a defendant’s likelihood of recurrence, Patel 
effectively elevated the officer and director bar, as an express remedy, to 
the same, if not a higher, standard than was required for a bar as a form 
of ancillary injunctive relief.  This was a dramatic reversal of Congress’s 
desire to strengthen SEC enforcement mechanisms.  Third, Patel held 
that the six factors were helpful considerations but not the elements of a 
mandatory or conjunctive test, which is precisely what the Steadman 
court had held.92  Nonetheless, Patel immediately abandoned this idea 
by holding that a bar may not be ordered without a positive showing of 
the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence.93  Fourth, Patel’s holding made 
it very unlikely that a first-time offender would be barred even if his or 
her misconduct was highly egregious, weakening the bar’s effectiveness 
as a deterrent.94  Fifth, even if the Second Circuit was justified in insist-
 87. Id. at 141-42; Cf. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1517 
(stating that the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence is at the core of the test for 
substantial unfitness). 
 88. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 142. 
 89. See id. at 141-42 (noting the stigma and loss of livelihood that results from an 
officer and director bar). 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1379, 1380-81. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 141; SEC v. Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
 93. See Patel, 61 F.3d at 142. 
 94. The defendant’s conduct in Patel is a good example:  the court reversed the 
district court’s bar order because the defendant had no past history of securities 
violations and because the district court pointed only to facts of the underlying violation 
to show a likelihood of future misconduct.  Id. at 141-42.  Of course, it is entirely 
possible that an egregious and willful violator will have no history of violations and that 
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ing on a showing of Patel’s likelihood of recidivism, it could easily have 
found such facts in the record.  The factors sufficient to prove a defend-
ant’s likelihood of future violations (the old test for obtaining an injunc-
tion in an SEC enforcement action) are almost identical to the first five 
factors in the Steadman-Barnard six-factor test.95  Thus, the Second 
Circuit had before it sufficient facts to establish Patel’s likelihood of re-
currence; nothing precluded the district court or the Second Circuit from 
making such a finding. 
Despite its problems, Patel became binding precedent in the Second 
Circuit and was extremely influential in other circuits.96  As a result, 
courts began denying the SEC’s request for a permanent officer and 
director bar even in cases where the defendant had committed egregious 
and criminal acts of securities fraud.97  Furthermore, temporary and con-
ditional bars became much more common forms of sanctions where the 
defendant was found “substantially unfit.”98  The “substantial unfitness” 
standard thus became a significant obstacle to the SEC enforcement 
regime, which Congress had sought to augment in the Remedies Act. 
E.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to “address the 
systematic and structural weaknesses affecting [the] capital markets 
which were [recently] revealed by repeated failures of” auditors, corpo-
rate managers, and broker-dealers.99  Among the provisions designed to 
 
the only facts available to show “substantial unfitness” are those of the underlying vio-
lation.  In those cases, the fact finder will be unable to demonstrate anything more than 
the prediction that an egregious violator of the public trust is likely to violate it again if 
given the chance. 
 95. Compare note 33 and accompanying text with notes 67 & 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 97. See, e.g., SEC v. McCaskey, No. 98 Civ. 6153, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13571, 
at *18-21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2001) (declining SEC’s request for a permanent bar of a 
firm manager that had made numerous false representations to investors over a number 
of years); SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367, at *8 (W.D.N.Y Nov. 
6, 1996) (holding that a bar is not appropriate for a talented director who had tipped and 
traded company stock prior to the announcement of a merger and was subsequently 
convicted for insider trading). 
 98. See, e.g., SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28313, at *50-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005); McCaskey, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13571, at *20 (imposing six-year bar from serving as an officer or director). 
 99. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002).  See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 
694 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
enhance the responsibility of corporate managers, Congress amended the 
director and officer bar statutes by changing the standard for obtaining a 
bar from “substantial unfitness” to mere “unfitness.”100  Before the pas-
sing of Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC staff publicly expressed frustration with 
the application of the popular six-factor test in Patel and its progeny.101  
Through its communications with the SEC during the drafting process, 
Congress was aware that courts had become increasingly hesitant to bar 
corporate managers, even those who had engaged in egregious and crim-
inal acts of securities fraud.102  Indeed, Congress’s purpose in amending 
the statutory language from “substantial unfitness” to “unfitness” was to 
ease the courts’ reluctance to impose officer and director bars in such 
cases.103 
Just as “substantial unfitness” was undefined in the Remedies Act, 
“unfitness” was also undefined in Sarbanes-Oxley.  Nevertheless, the 
general tenor of Sarbanes-Oxley and its legislative history show that 
Congress intended to make the standard less onerous on the SEC and to 
signal to the courts that a change was necessary in the application of the 
director and officer bar.104  Thus, the lower standard of “unfitness,” al-
though undefined, was Congress’s solution to Patel and its influence as 
the prevailing judicial interpretation of the officer and director bar stat-
utes. 
One interpretation of the “unfitness” standard appears in a speech 
by David Cutler, former Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, 
in which he suggested that a bar should be appropriate whenever a cor-
porate executive has committed a “single serious breach of the public 
trust.”105  This interpretation is consistent with Congress’s view of the 
officer and director bar as provided in the legislative history of the 
Remedies Act, which states that a bar is particularly appropriate where 
the defendant engaged in fraud as a corporate fiduciary106 and the mis-
194-208 (reciting a brief history of the corporate scandals that prompted Congress to 
pass Sarbanes-Oxley and a concise list of the provisions of the Act). 
 100. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305, 15 U.S.C. §78u (2006); S. REP. No. 107-
205, at 26-27. 
 101. See Cutler, supra note 58. 
 102. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26-27. 
 103. Id. at 27. 
 104. Id. at 26-27. 
 105. Cutler,  supra note 58. 
 106. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 31 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1394. 
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conduct was egregious.107  Moreover, such a scenario likely satisfies 
three of the six factors:  it is egregious; the defendant is engaging in 
fraud while holding the position of a corporate fiduciary; and as with all 
fraud, scienter is present.108  Such misconduct would justify a bar under 
a disjunctive test like Steadman’s, but likely not under Patel’s, unless 
the defendant had engaged in past misconduct or other facts clearly de-
monstrated a likelihood of future misconduct.109 
Sarbanes-Oxley marked a dramatic change in the way the govern-
ment sought to use the officer and director bar.110  First, Congress 
clearly intended to overrule Patel and the line of cases that required the 
SEC to demonstrate a likelihood of recurrence in each case.111  Indeed, 
some district courts in the Second Circuit support this view.112  These 
cases, which hold that the defendant’s likelihood of future misconduct is 
not a requirement to institute a bar, support the inference that Congress 
overruled Patel because courts in the Second Circuit would be bound by 
stare decisis and therefore obligated to follow Patel unless it was speci-
fically overruled.  Second, Sarbanes-Oxley gave the SEC the authority 
to call any person before an administrative judge and request an officer 
and director bar.113  Some commentators have criticized this power be-
cause it gives the SEC the advantage of imposing a bar before its own 
tribunal and according to its own interpretation of “unfitness.”114  These 
concerns may be somewhat misguided as the SEC faces substantial evi-
dentiary burdens in administrative actions115 and the test for obtaining 
any sanction in an SEC administrative proceeding is the Steadman six-
factor test.116  Moreover, the SEC has sought very few officer and direc-
tor bars in administrative proceedings.117 
 107. S. REP. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990). 
 108. Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 184, 194 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 109. See supra Part I.D. 
 110. See Kris Frieswick, Bar Hopping, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011961?f=related (quoting John X. Peloso). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See SEC v. Drucker, 528 F.Supp.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); SEC v. Global 
Telecom Servs., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(f), 78u-3(f) (2006). 
 114. See Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officer and Directors After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 BUS. LAW. 391, 392 (2004). 
 115. Brian A. Ochs et al., Sanctions and Collateral Consequences, in THE 
SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 211 (Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis 
LLP ed., 2d ed. 2007). 
 116. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43,862, 2001 SEC 
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Despite the changes that Sarbanes-Oxley brought to the juris-
prudence of the officer and director bar, its purpose is fundamentally 
consistent with the purposes of the Remedies Act and the purposes of 
the securities laws dating back to the original Securities Act of 1933.  
The securities laws aimed to facilitate disclosure and promote fairness in 
the market.118  The SEC was meant to be the advocate for the public in-
vestor.119  The SEC’s enforcement remedies were supposed to effectuate 
restitution of illegal investor losses, punish wrongdoers, and deter poten-
tial violators.120  Congress’s amendment to the officer and director bar 
statutes in Sarbanes-Oxley was not an errant act; rather, it was 
Congress’s attempt to realign those courts that strayed from the original 
purposes set out by the securities laws. 
II. 
Most courts have yet to recognize this change.  Many courts still 
cite “substantial unfitness” as the standard for imposing an officer and 
director bar.121  Other courts have noted the amended language but 
maintain the status quo by emphasizing the importance of the 
defendant’s history of violations and the likelihood of recurrence over 
other considerations.122  Many courts also continue to follow Patel by 
asking whether a temporary bar is appropriate in every case.123  Each of 
these approaches is problematic because Congress amended the bar 
statutes to end the courts’ reliance on Patel, and to allay the courts’ 
LEXIS 98, at *98 (Jan. 19, 2001). 
 117. Ochs et al., supra note 115, at 211-12. 
 118. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). 
 119. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 157 (3d ed. 
2003). 
 120. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1379, 1381-82. 
 121. See, e.g., SEC v. Aqua Vie Beverage Corp., No. CV 04-414-S-EJL, 2008 WL 
1914723, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 29, 2008); SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l, Corp., No. 
04CV2105, 2007 WL 1238707, at *14-15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007) (overruled on other 
grounds); SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 412, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
SEC v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776-77 (E.D. Penn. 2005); SEC v. Johnson, No. 
02-5490, 2004 WL 5561799, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2004). 
 122. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 532 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(granting officer and director bar after considering factors and specifically determining 
that there was a likelihood that defendant would engage in future misconduct). 
 123. See, e.g., SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28313, at *50-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005). 
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lfilled. 
reluctance to permanently bar individuals who cannot be trusted as 
corporate fiduciaries.124  Because the bulk of the case law following 
Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that the courts misunderstand the director 
and officer bar amendment, Congress’s intent has yet to be fu
A.  Courts Still Cite “Substantial Unfitness” as Standard 
Most of the case law after Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that courts 
remain unaware of the amended officer and director unfitness standard.  
In these cases, the courts continue to state that the imposition of an offi-
cer and director bar requires a showing of “substantial unfitness.”125  
These courts have stated the law incorrectly.  Furthermore, these opin-
ions show that courts have misunderstood those aspects of the “substan-
tial unfitness” test that Sarbanes-Oxley sought to rectify.126  Many of 
these courts continue to cite Patel, not only as the genesis of the six-
factor test, but also for the position that a temporary bar should always 
be considered before imposing a permanent bar.127  Moreover, these 
courts’ analyses continue to place too much emphasis on the defendant’s 
likelihood of recurrence.128  Thus, it is insufficient to say that these opin-
ions have simply neglected to state the correct “unfitness” standard; the 
greater problem lies in their failure to observe the fundamental change in 
the law brought about by Sarbanes-Oxley. 
B.  Courts Note Change in Statutory Language  
But Have Not Changed Analysis 
Some courts have acknowledged the linguistic change from 
“substantial unfitness” to “unfitness,” but have not yet adjusted the sub-
stance of the test accordingly.129  In essence, for these courts, the words 
 
 124. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 26-27 (2002). 
 125. See, e.g., Aqua Vie Beverage Corp., 2008 WL 1914723, at *2; Platforms 
Wireless Int’l, Corp., 2007 WL 1238707, at *14-15; Universal Express, 475 F. Supp. 2d 
at 429; Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 776-77; Johnson, 2004 WL 5561799, at *4. 
 126. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Aqua Vie Beverage Corp., 2008 WL 1914723, at *2 (stating standard is 
substantial unfitness and granting a temporary bar); Platforms Wireless Int’l, Corp., 
2007 WL 1238707, at *14-15. 
 128. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 532 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 129. See SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28313, at *48-52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005) (citing standard as “unfitness” but 
temporarily barring defendant who had no past history of violations in the United 
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have changed, but the meaning remains the same.130  This is problematic 
for two reasons.  First, it suggests that Patel retains considerable influ-
ence despite Congress’s determination to overrule Patel in Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Second, to the extent that courts have noted a change in the lan-
guage, it is unclear why so few have openly stated the issue and attempt-
ed to find an acceptable interpretation of the new “unfitness” standard.131 
C.  Courts Offer No Analysis 
A few courts since Sarbanes-Oxley have adjusted their analysis in 
response to the amended standard by completely dispensing with any 
determination of the defendant’s “unfitness.”132  This approach, in which 
courts try to satisfy the lesser “unfitness” standard with lax legal analy-
sis, is unacceptable.  The purpose of the “unfitness” inquiry is for the 
court to find some nexus between the defendant’s act of fraud and the 
need for a bar.133  The defendant and the public must receive some ex-
planation for the court’s decision, and the appellate courts need to see a 
basis for the trial court’s conclusion, to determine whether the lower 
court abused its discretion. 
While the test was applied too stringently in Patel, these courts 
have allowed it to become too lenient.  If Congress had intended courts 
to impose a bar for every commission of fraud, it would have dispensed 
with the “unfitness” requirement all together.  Courts should continue to 
engage in the unfitness inquiry by providing a full and clear analysis of 
the law and facts of each case. 
Each of the above categories of court action is an example of a 
common problem:  courts have responded to the amended language in 
Sarbanes-Oxley with unacceptable applications of the new “unfitness” 
standard.  Ignorance of the amendment and erroneous adherence to 
 
States); SEC v. Maxxon, No. 02-CV-975-H(J), 2005 WL 6090229, at *5 (N.D. Okla. 
Mar. 11, 2005) (acknowledging “unfitness” as standard and noting defendant’s on-
going and egregious pattern of fraudulent misconduct, but temporarily barring defend-
ant without finding a likelihood of recurrence). 
 130. The most likely explanation for these decisions is that these courts continue to 
look to judicial precedent for guidance and do not realize that the amendment of the bar 
statute was intended to correct problems within that body of precedent. 
 131. One of the few courts to openly address the amended language of the bar 
statute was the D.C. District in SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2007).  For 
a discussion of the Levine case, see infra Part III.B. 
 132. See, e.g., SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 133. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1494. 
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Patel’s still-powerful influence in the courts may be the explanation.  
Another possibility is that courts are concerned about the harsh conse-
quences of an officer and director bar and are quietly adjusting their le-
gal analysis in an effort to limit those consequences.  Still, some courts 
appear only too willing to bar a defendant without setting forth a clear 
and rational basis for their decision.  The officer and director bar was 
intended to be a powerful deterrent and remedy for fraudulent mis-
conduct but, as with all SEC sanctions, the interest of the public in fair 
and efficient markets must be balanced with the interests of the defend-
ant.134  Before the officer and director bar can operate as intended, courts 
must respond to the amended standard by developing a fair and work-
able test for determining whether a defendant is unfit. 
III. 
Courts could depart in several ways from the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
case law to adjust the test from one that determines “substantial 
unfitness” to one that determines “unfitness.”  At least one federal dis-
trict court has already attempted to develop a test to determine a defend-
ant’s “unfitness.”135  That court’s test is offered here as a potential solu-
tion.  As with most human endeavors, however, the simplest solution is 
likely the most effective.  If Congress meant Sarbanes-Oxley to overrule 
certain aspects of the Patel holding, then courts should proceed with the 
six factors without those offending parts. 
In creating a test to determine whether a defendant is unfit to serve 
as an executive of a public company, courts and commentators should be 
willing to rethink the purposes of the officer and director bar.  Congress 
provided two chief purposes in the Remedies Act’s legislative history:  
deterrence and protection of public investors from proven violators.136  
Congress also charged courts with the duty to balance the government’s 
interest in obtaining a bar137 with the defendant’s interest in retaining his 
or her means of making a living.138  Any proposed solution to this 
lingering “unfitness” problem should serve the purposes of the bar and 
 134. SEC v. Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 135. Levine, 517 F. Supp. at 144-46. 
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1394. 
 137. The SEC is ultimately interested in protection of shareholders and the honesty, 
integrity, and efficiency of the market.  Id. at 1381. 
 138. Steadman, 603 F.2d at 1139-40. 
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promote fairness by maintaining the proper balance between the 
interests of the government and the 
A.  Proposed Test for Determining Whether Defendant is Unfit to Serve 
This Note suggests that courts acknowledge the Sarbanes-Oxley 
amendment and seek to determine a defendant’s “unfitness” through 
consideration and analysis of the Steadman-Barnard six factors.  No sin-
gle factor should be dispositive; courts should even be prepared to im-
pose a bar in the absence of any of the listed factors, as long as they pro-
vide a reasoned analysis of their conclusion that the defendant is unfit to 
serve as a director or officer.  The advantage of this solution is that it 
creates flexibility by allowing courts to examine and present the facts of 
each case against a variety of considerations without making any factor 
or combination of factors dispositive of “unfitness” or “fitness.”  Fur-
thermore, this method is the least disruptive to the existing body of 
precedents and is consistent with the purposes of the Remedies Act and 
Sarbanes-Oxley.139 
This proposed “unfitness” test satisfies Congress’s intent by resolv-
ing the major problem with Patel, specifically, the requirement that the 
SEC show one of the six “considerations” in every case before the court 
may issue a bar order.140  Because securities fraud occurs in a variety of 
forms, the “unfitness” inquiry must be sufficiently flexible to protect the 
market from unscrupulous corporate fiduciaries.141  The proposed solu-
tion provides an appropriate level of flexibility.  Whereas Patel required 
a clear showing of one factor, the new test would permit the presence of 
some factors to make up for the absence of others.  Thus, a court could 
impose an officer and director bar without being rigidly forced to show 
any particular factor or combination of factors. 
The proposed test is the least disruptive interpretation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley amendment because it adheres to the basic six-factor 
test found in Patel and the rest of the officer and director bar cases, 
while dispensing with the problematic legal holdings of those cases.  
Furthermore, it is consistent with Steadman and the long line of SEC 
enforcement case law.142 
The new test is flexible enough to be applied to a wide array of cor-
 
 139. See supra Parts I.C and I.E. 
 140. See supra Part I.E. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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porate misconduct.  Congress clearly favored such flexibility when it es-
tablished the officer and director bar in the Remedies Act.143  In addi-
tion, courts have long been wary of rigid definitions in federal securities 
laws.144  A rigid or static definition or test invites clever minds to cir-
cumvent the protections provided by the law.145  In the same way, 
“unfitness” should not be a static concept, which may be the reason 
Congress left it undefined.146  Any workable test for “unfitness” must be 
flexible enough to address the many forms of misconduct that may occur 
in the market, and must also be able to adapt as the market grows and 
changes.  Such flexibility has long been the hallmark in securities law147 
and is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley, which was a reaction to previ-
ously unimaginable corporate scandals.148  It is also consistent with the 
purposes of both the Remedies Act and Sarbanes-Oxley, which sought 
to provide the SEC with an effective remedy and deterrent.149 
The proposed test is fair and provides courts with an appropriate 
level of discretion to impose or deny an officer and director bar.  A 
permanent officer and director bar is an extraordinary sanction to impose 
on a corporate executive and may interfere with shareholders’ right to 
select firm managers.150  At the same time, the officer and director bar is 
an effective way to keep untrustworthy executives out of the manage-
ment teams of public companies and to send a strong signal to the mar-
ket that misconduct will not be tolerated.151  In considering these com-
peting interests, Congress has stated the following: 
Some commentators have suggested that a court ordered bar in-
fringes upon the right of shareholders to determine for themselves 
who should serve as their elected management.  However, public 
 143. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 2, 7 (1990). 
 144. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (asserting a 
definition for “investment contract” with sufficient flexibility to “meet the countless and 
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the 
promise of profits”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 147. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
 148. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 194-208. 
 149. See supra Parts I.B and I.E. 
 150. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1490-91. 
 151. Congress intended the officer and director bar to serve two principal purposes: 
assurance to public investors that the securities markets are safe and deterrence of 
corporate misconduct.  H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1394. 
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shareholders may lack sufficient control to remove securities law 
violators from office or otherwise to protect their own interests.  In 
addition, in some cases, the shareholders may have been the direct 
beneficiaries of the wrongdoing and thus may have little economic 
incentive to vote out the violators.  Moreover, broader public 
interests are involved when the actions of the violator undermine the 
integrity of the markets.152 
The proposed test allows courts the flexibility to consider any 
combination of the six factors and reach a conclusion that balances these 
competing interests and provides a fair and effective result in each case.  
Courts should make full use of the factual record and explain their find-
ings in each case.  Once courts begin to apply the suggested test, the 
developing body of case law will guide later courts and litigants in deter-
mining the likelihood or appropriateness of imposing a bar in any given 
situation. 
Finally, the proposed test resolves the problems with prior case law, 
particularly Patel, as well as any ambiguity in Professor Barnard’s six-
factor test.  Patel’s fundamental problem was that it required the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the defendant was likely to engage in future 
misconduct before a bar could be imposed.153  Professor Barnard like-
wise stated that this one factor – the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence 
– was at the core of the “unfitness” inquiry154 and admonished Congress 
to amend the bar statutes with language requiring the SEC to show the 
defendant’s likelihood of recurrence in every case.155  Nevertheless, 
Congress has taken the position that an officer and director bar is espe-
cially appropriate where corporate executives have engaged in egregious 
fraud without regard for the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence.156  
Furthermore, the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley indicates that the 
statute was amended in response to cases like Patel.157  Under the pro-
posed “unfitness” test, the government would be able to obtain a bar 
against defendants like Patel without demonstrating the defendant’s like-
lihood of future misconduct, so long as it could show other factors, such 
 152. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 18 (1990). 
 153. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
 154. Barnard, Substantially Unfit to Serve?, supra note 42, at 1517. 
 155. Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC’s Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1271-72 (2002). 
 156. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 17. 
 157. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 26-27 (2002). 
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as egregiousness, scienter, and the fact that the defendant is a corporate 
fiduciary. 
B.  Professor Barnard’s Nine-Factor Test for Determining “Unfitness” 
An alternative solution to that suggested by this Note is a proposal 
by Professor Barnard in a 2005 law review article.158  Barnard suggested 
that courts determine “unfitness” by considering the following nine 
factors: 
(1) the nature and complexity of the scheme, (2) the defendant’s role 
in the scheme, (3) the use of corporate resources in executing the 
scheme, (4) the defendant’s financial gain (or loss avoidance) from 
the scheme, (5) the loss to investors and others as a result of that 
scheme, (6) whether the scheme represents an isolated occurrence or 
a pattern or misconduct, (7) the defendant’s use of stealth and 
concealment, (8) the defendant’s history of business and related mis-
conduct, and (9) the defendant’s acknowledgement of wrongdoing 
and the credibility of his contrition.159 
Here, Professor Barnard suggests that courts not consider the list 
exhaustive nor any of the factors dispositive.160  Additionally, while she 
urges courts to raise the SEC’s burden of proof from preponderance of 
the evidence to clear and convincing evidence,161 she also seems to sug-
gest that a court may find a defendant unfit without all factors being 
present.162 
At least one court has applied Professor Barnard’s new formu-
lation.163  The court in SEC v. Levine, unlike most other courts following 
Sarbanes-Oxley, expressly acknowledged that Congress had amended 
 
 158. Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10-b and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 
(2005) [hereinafter Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question]. 
 159. Id. at 46. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 45.  It is highly unlikely that any court would raise the burden of proof 
from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence.  See SEC v. 
Steadman, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that preponderance of the 
evidence is the proper standard in all SEC enforcement and disbarment actions as any 
higher standard would be detrimental to the public interest). 
 162. See Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question, supra note 158, at 47 (suggesting that 
courts find unfitness in cases of high egregiousness, “especially when some of the other 
factors listed below are present” (emphasis added)). 
 163. SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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the officer and director bar statutes and appropriately sought a method 
for determining the new, reduced “unfitness” standard.164  Ultimately, 
the Levine court barred the defendant for ten years, a sanction remi-
niscent of Patel’s insistence that courts favor temporary officer and 
director bars over permanent bars.165  Furthermore, the court pointed to 
the defendant’s active management of a public company at all times 
during the trial as evidence that the defendant was likely to be involved 
in future misconduct.166  This suggests that the Levine court was not 
acting independent of the influence of Patel.  That is not surprising, 
however, because Professor Barnard’s nine-factor test strongly en-
courages courts to find that the defendant is likely to engage in future 
misconduct before imposing a bar.167 
Professor Barnard’s nine-factor test has both positive and negative 
attributes.  On the one hand, it is undeniably flexible because it provides 
courts with nine possible considerations rather than six.  These con-
siderations may prove useful for courts that have reached a stalemate in 
applying the six-factor test and need more factors to reach a conclusion.  
On the other hand, Professor Barnard indicates that, in addition to con-
sidering the nine factors, courts should find that the defendant is likely 
to engage in future misconduct before imposing a bar.168  In this way, 
the new test ignores the most critical meaning of the “unfitness” 
standard:  neither the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence nor any other 
particular factor should be required.169  The addition of new factors 
without the resolution of this issue signals a return to the Patel 
framework, and is therefore not a solution that seeks to honor 
Congressional intent in Sarbanes-Oxley.  This Note suggests that courts 
should not so thwart the will of Congress.  Congress overruled Patel’s 
static formulation of the “substantial unfitness” test in Sarbanes-Oxley 
and demonstrated its desire that courts develop and use a mo
 164. Id. at 144. 
 165. Id. at 146. 
 166. Id. at 131-32. 
 167. Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question, supra note 158, at 15. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See supra Part I.E. 
 170. See id. 
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C.  Comparison of the Proposed Test and Professor Barnard’s 
 Nine-Factor Test 
To illustrate the differences between the “unfitness” test proposed 
by this Note and Professor Barnard’s nine-factor test, I will apply both 
tests to the facts of the Patel case, and compare the results.  This 
comparison will highlight the strengths of the proposed test and the 
weaknesses of the alternative nine-factor test. 
The Proposed Test 
Applying the proposed test to the facts of Patel,171 the six factors 
break down as follows: 
 
(1) Egregiousness of the Underlying Violation:  The violation 
was egregious because it resulted in enormous shareholder 
losses, it involved a scheme to defraud the FDA, and it 
showed a blatant disregard for public safety.  This favors a 
bar. 
(2) Defendant’s Repeat Offender Status: The defendant has no 
past violations of law.  This favors denial of a bar. 
(3) Defendant’s Role in the Fraud: The defendant was an officer 
of the corporation and an active participant.  This favors a 
bar. 
(4) Defendant’s Degree of Scienter: The defendant’s fraudulent 
acts were not negligent, but rather were intentional or highly 
reckless; the defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known that the scheme to defraud the FDA was illegal and 
that, if caught, the company’s stock price would plummet.  
Furthermore, the defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known that he defrauded investors who purchased his shares 
in the selloff prior to the public announcement of the 
indictment.  This favors a bar. 
(5) Defendant’s Economic Stake in the Violation: The defend-
ant’s scheme initially increased the company’s value by 
making it appear highly competitive; the defendant then sold 
a block of his shares to avoid the inevitable losses.  This 
favors a bar, though the defendant may argue that the loss 
 
 171. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of the Patel case. 
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avoided was not large in comparison with total shareholder 
losses and the total amount of stock he held. 
(6) Likelihood that Misconduct Will Recur: The defendant’s 
scheme was ongoing and showed his blatant disregard for 
laws protecting prescription drug users and public investors.  
This factor does not clearly favor a bar.  That is, simply 
restating the facts of the underlying violation may not be suf-
ficient to demonstrate a likelihood of recurrence, especially 
if the defendant has accepted responsibility for his actions.  
Nevertheless, applying the five factor test currently used by 
courts to determine the likelihood of recurrence when 
issuing an injunction, a court may find a likelihood of future 
misconduct.  The scheme was ongoing and continuous, the 
violation evidenced a high level of scienter, and the nature of 
the defendant’s profession places him at risk for future 
violations.172 
 
Under the proposed test, a court could find the defendant unfit to 
serve as the manager of a public company.  Even if the defendant has no 
history of past violations, or if the court is not convinced that the SEC 
has established a likelihood of future misconduct, the court may still 
impose a bar if, in its discretion, it is convinced that the egregiousness of 
the violation, the high level of scienter, and the defendant’s role as a 
corporate fiduciary at the time of the fraud render the defendant unfit. 
Professor Barnard’s Nine-Factor Test 
Applying Professor Barnard’s more recent nine-factor test173 to the 
facts in Patel,174 a court may find as follows: 
 
(1) The Nature and Complexity of the Scheme:  The scheme was 
complex, as it involved a conspiracy with FDA staff and was 
unlikely to be discovered without the intervention of a 
federal investigation.  The scheme endangered the public and 
introduced false information about the company into the 
 172. See, e.g., SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 611 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 173. See Barnard, The “Unfitness” Question, supra note 158, at 46-53 (listing and 
discussing the factors). 
 174. See supra Part I.D. 
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securities market, resulting in shareholder losses.  This 
favors a bar. 
(2) The Defendant’s Role in the Scheme:  The defendant served 
as a corporate fiduciary while engaging in the fraud and may 
have had a leadership role in the scheme.  This favors a bar. 
(3) The Use of Corporate Resources in Executing the Scheme:  
The defendant may have used corporate resources or time to 
engage in the fraud, but there are no facts that firmly 
establish this.  This favors denial of a bar. 
(4) The Defendant’s Financial Gain (or Loss Avoidance) from 
the Scheme:  The defendant profited from the scheme, 
though the amount of profit and loss avoidance may not be 
sufficient to find the defendant unfit.  This factor may or 
may not favor a bar. 
(5) The Loss to Investors and Others as a Result of the Scheme:  
The defendant’s scheme caused a major decline in the price 
of the company’s publicly traded stock and shareholders 
likely suffered heavy losses.  This favors a bar. 
(6) Whether the Scheme Represents an Isolated Occurrence or a 
Pattern of Misconduct:  The conspiracy with the FDA staff 
was ongoing, but the illegal sell-off of company stock oc-
curred only once.  This may or may not favor a bar 
(7) The Defendant’s Use of Stealth and Concealment:  There are 
no facts suggesting that the defendant absconded with funds 
or altered financial documents.  This favors denial of a bar. 
(8) The Defendant’s History of Business and Related Miscon-
duct:  Besides the ongoing nature of the fraudulent mis-
conduct, the defendant does not have any prior history of 
violations.  This may or may not favor a bar. 
(9) The Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Wrongdoing and the 
Credibility of His Contrition:  The defendant admitted his 
role in the scheme and conceded that it was fraud, but there 
are no facts to show defendant’s contrition.  This may or 
may not favor a bar. 
 
If the nine factors in Professor Barnard’s test are considered dis-
junctively, a court may find the defendant unfit to serve as a corporate 
fiduciary of a public company.  Nevertheless, if courts apply Professor 
Barnard’s suggestion that the SEC must also show that the defendant is 
likely to engage in future misconduct unless barred, the nine-factor test 
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essentially merges with the holding in Patel, and the end result of 
Sarbanes-Oxley amendment would be nothing more than a transforma-
tion of the six-factor test into a nine-factor test. 
The purpose of this comparison is to show that neither the six-factor 
test nor the nine-factor test presents a problem so long as the court is 
free to consider each factor disjunctively and exercise its discretion in 
determining the defendant’s fitness to serve.  Requiring the courts to 
make a positive finding of the defendant’s likelihood of recurrence, or 
elevating any other particular factor above the others will always present 
a problem.  It is precisely that problem that Congress sought to rectify in 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  If the SEC can establish that the defendant is likely to 
engage in future violations, it could easily obtain an officer and director 
bar as a form of ancillary injunctive relief, and the officer and director 
bar statutes would be unnecessary.  For the officer and director bar stat-
utes to be effective, the test for “unfitness” must be flexible enough to 
apply to the wide range of possible acts of securities fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress amended the officer and director bar statutes in Sarbanes-
Oxley in an effort to increase the accountability of corporate managers 
who engage in securities fraud.  The Sarbanes-Oxley legislative history 
indicates Congress’s intent to overrule prior case law and invite courts to 
establish a more flexible standard for determining when an officer and 
director bar is appropriate.  This Note suggests that courts continue to 
adhere to a variation of the six-factor test applied in those early cases 
and apply the factors disjunctively.  Unlike those cases overruled by 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the test proposed by this Note does not require courts to 
establish the defendant’s likelihood of future violations or any single 
factor of “unfitness” in particular before imposing a bar.  Rather, the 
proposed test encourages courts to consider a wide range of aggravating 
factors, as well as a positive finding of securities fraud, before deter-
mining that an officer and director bar is appropriate. 
 
